nfc: fdp: bound the device-reported read length and fix an skb leak
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ a06347c04c13e380afce0c9816df51f00b83faf1 · < db7e464b350969c6ea8340de00d9796e5fd5123b| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: fdp: bound the device-reported read length and fix an skb leak
fdp_nci_i2c_read() takes the next packet length from two device-supplied bytes and never validates it. The value is a u16 used as the i2c_master_recv() count into a 261-byte on-stack buffer: a malicious, counterfeit or malfunctioning controller (or an i2c bus interposer) can drive it far past the buffer for a stack out-of-bounds write that clobbers the canary and return address, or below the minimum frame size (directly, or by truncating the computed sum) so the header/LRC strip and the next length read run past a short receive. Reject a length outside [FDP_NCI_I2C_MIN_PAYLOAD, FDP_NCI_I2C_MAX_PAYLOAD], as a corrupted packet already is, and force resynchronization.
The same loop allocates one data skb per iteration and assumes a length packet followed by a data packet; a device that sends two data packets in one call leaks the first skb when the second allocation overwrites it. Free a previously allocated skb before allocating the next.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s NFC FDP I2C read function does not validate a device-reported packet length before reading into a stack buffer. A malicious, counterfeit, or malfunctioning controller, or an I2C bus interposer, can cause a stack out-of-bounds write or an out-of-bounds read; two data packets in one call can also leak a buffer. The described attack requires control of the controller or I2C bus, not network access.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the NFC FDP I2C driver should check their versions; affected versions were not provided.