nfc: llcp: reject PDUs shorter than the LLCP header
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ d646960f7986fefb460a2b062d5ccc8ccfeacc3a · < e969e98410051b1ef8cc318bfe0c7e3f24ec766d| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: reject PDUs shorter than the LLCP header
Every LLCP PDU begins with a two-byte header (DSAP/SSAP + PTYPE), but the receive path never checked that a frame is at least LLCP_HEADER_SIZE bytes before parsing it.
nfc_llcp_rx_skb() reads the header via nfc_llcp_ptype()/nfc_llcp_dsap()/ nfc_llcp_ssap(), which dereference pdu->data[0] and pdu->data[1], and a CONNECT or CC PDU then computes
tlv_array_len = skb->len - LLCP_HEADER_SIZE;
as a size_t and hands it to the TLV walk. When the frame is shorter than the header the subtraction wraps to a huge value and the walk runs far past the buffer, an out-of-bounds read.
A nearby NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP.
Guard the common receive choke point __nfc_llcp_recv(), shared by both the target (nfc_llcp_data_received()) and initiator (nfc_llcp_recv()) paths, so a short skb is dropped before the rx_work worker parses it. Use pskb_may_pull() rather than a skb->len test so the two header bytes are guaranteed to sit in the skb linear area even for a non-linear skb, matching how the sibling NCI and HCI receive paths validate their headers.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel NFC LLCP receive path can read beyond a buffer when it parses a PDU shorter than the two-byte LLCP header. A nearby NFC device can trigger this without authentication; LLCP link activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP.
Engineers running Linux kernels with NFC LLCP support should check their exposure; affected versions are not specified.