futex/pi: Reject cross-mm private futex owners
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex/pi: Reject cross-mm private futex owners
A private futex key borrows the waiter's mm without taking an mm_users reference. Nevertheless, attach_to_pi_owner() currently accepts an owner from a different address space and copies the private key into the owner's PI state.
When that owner exits, exit_pi_state_list() uses the saved key to find the hash bucket and acquires a reference to the waiter's private hash. If the last user of the waiter's mm exits concurrently, futex_hash_free() frees the hash while the owner still uses its bucket and reference.
Prevent this by validating in attach_to_pi_owner() that, for private futexes, the owner mm and waiter mm are the same. Perform the check with the owner's pi_lock held and after validating owner::futex::state to serialize against a concurrent PI-state exit cleanup.
[ tglx: Amended comment ]
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's futex PI handling can accept a private futex owner from a different address space. If that owner exits while the waiter's address space is being freed, it can use a freed futex hash. The input does not specify authentication requirements or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions are not specified.