selinux: do not cancel a policy conversion that never started
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 02a52c5c8c3b8cbad0f12009cde9f36dbefb6972 · < 1b4ff94ae7c580c880291519fb0e3e2bd075beef| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: do not cancel a policy conversion that never started
sel_write_load() calls selinux_policy_cancel() when sel_make_policy_nodes() fails, and that helper dereferences the outgoing policy to cancel its sidtab conversion. On the first policy load there is no outgoing policy: security_load_policy() returns early for that case, before it converts anything, and state->policy is still NULL. A first load that fails while building the selinuxfs tree therefore takes a NULL dereference in selinux_policy_cancel(), reached from a write(2) to /sys/fs/selinux/load.
Skip the cancel when there is no old policy, mirroring the check security_load_policy() already makes before it converts.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's SELinux policy loader can dereference a NULL pointer during the first policy load if building the selinuxfs tree fails. The failure is reached through a local write to /sys/fs/selinux/load; the input does not specify whether authentication or other privileges are required.
Engineers running Linux kernels with SELinux should check their kernel against the vendor advisory; affected versions are not specified.