selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 55fcf09b3fe4325c9395ebbb0322a547a157ebc7 · < d14b5d0e97fccd27974fedc03b903408872907fd| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count
perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1] into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the nested per-class permission table is not.
Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected.
[PM: tweak comment for line length]
From the CVE record · Linux
SELinux permission parsing does not check a permission value against the owning class’s permission count. If a policy declares fewer permissions than its largest permission value, processing it can cause an out-of-bounds heap write. The input does not specify how an attacker could supply such a policy.
Engineers running Linux kernels with SELinux should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions are not specified.