sctp: validate Adaptation Indication parameter length
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · < 17b412468c7a44f66a385bda48cdc1e94e39bd6d| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate Adaptation Indication parameter length
The Adaptation Layer Indication parameter contains a fixed 32-bit Adaptation Code Point after its parameter header. However, sctp_verify_param() accepts a header-only parameter because the generic parameter walker only requires the header to be present.
sctp_process_param() then reads adaptation_ind beyond the declared parameter. When the malformed parameter is last in an INIT, the read starts at the receive skb tail, and the value is copied into the state cookie returned in the INIT ACK. This may disclose four receive-buffer tail bytes.
Require the declared parameter length to match the fixed structure size and abort the association through the existing invalid parameter length path otherwise.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s SCTP parameter validation accepts an Adaptation Layer Indication parameter that contains only a header. If that malformed parameter is last in a received INIT, the kernel may copy four receive-buffer tail bytes into the state cookie returned in the INIT ACK. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected SCTP code should check their systems; affected versions are not specified.