Input: iforce - validate input packet lengths
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| Linux Linux |
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≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · < a64a8b6b31cd669f0449138e53cc2592d454ccf1| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: iforce - validate input packet lengths
iforce_process_packet() reads fixed fields from joystick, wheel and status packets without first checking their lengths. In particular, the shared hats-and-buttons helper unconditionally reads data[6]. The status tail is a sequence of 16-bit effect addresses, but an incomplete final address is also consumed. A successful zero-length USB URB additionally reads the packet ID before the common parser is called.
Reject the zero-length USB transfer, require the seven-byte joystick and wheel prefixes and the two-byte status prefix, and consume only complete status-tail addresses.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's iforce input driver reads packet fields without first checking that the packets are long enough. Short joystick, wheel, or status packets, or a successful zero-length USB transfer, can cause it to read beyond the packet. The input does not specify attacker access or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the iforce input driver should check their versions; affected versions are not specified.