Ech0 before 4.7.3 OAuth Redirect URI Validation Bypass
lin-snow Ech0
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 Go |
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| github.com/lin-snow/ech0 Go |
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lin-snow Ech0
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 Go |
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| github.com/lin-snow/ech0 Go |
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Ech0 through 4.5.6 contains an OAuth redirect URI validation vulnerability in parseAndValidateClientRedirect (internal/service/auth/auth.go) that compares only the scheme and host of the client-supplied redirect_uri against the admin-configured allowlist, ignoring path, query, and fragment components. The redirect_uri is embedded into the signed state JWT at login time without validation. An attacker can craft a redirect_uri whose host matches an allowed origin but whose path is attacker-influenced; after the OAuth exchange the victim is redirected to that path with a one-time exchange code in the query string. If the code leaks (e.g., via Referer, analytics, or an open redirect on that host), the attacker can trade it at the public POST /api/auth/exchange endpoint for the victim's access and refresh tokens. Fixed in 4.7.3.
From the CVE record · VulnCheck
Ech0 through 4.5.6 validates only the scheme and host of an OAuth redirect URI, ignoring its path, query, and fragment. A network attacker can craft a redirect to an attacker-influenced path on an allowed host; if a victim completes OAuth login and the resulting one-time code leaks, the attacker can exchange it for the victim’s access and refresh tokens.
Teams running Ech0 through 4.5.6 or either Go package, github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 or github.com/lin-snow/ech0, before 1.4.8-0.20260503040728-a7e8b8e84bd1 should check their deployments.