Tinyauth: Unauthenticated login attempts can trigger global login lockdown denial of service
tinyauthapp tinyauth
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth Go |
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| github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth Go |
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tinyauthapp tinyauth
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth Go |
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| github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth Go |
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Tinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to 5.1.0, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send POST /api/user/login requests with 257 distinct nonexistent usernames to fill MaxLoginAttemptRecords and activate a global login lockdown. internal/controller/user_controller.go loginHandler passes each attacker-controlled identifier to internal/service/auth_service.go RecordLoginAttempt, which invokes lockdownMode after the map reaches its cap. IsAccountLocked checks that global state before validating unrelated accounts, causing valid users to receive HTTP 429 until auth.loginTimeout expires, approximately 300 seconds by default. The attack can be repeated, but existing authenticated sessions are not invalidated. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.0.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
Prior to version 5.1.0, Tinyauth's login handling allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to trigger a global login lockdown by submitting 257 distinct nonexistent usernames. Valid users then receive HTTP 429 for approximately 300 seconds by default; the attack can be repeated, but existing authenticated sessions remain valid.
Operators of Tinyauth before 5.1.0 and users of either Go package, github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth or github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth, before 1.0.1-0.20260715123057-dade1e2c8f27 should check their deployments.