Omnivore Stored Server-Side Request Forgery via the setWebhook Mutation
omnivore-app omnivore
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| omnivore-app omnivore |
| No fix yet |
Original description
The setWebhookResolver in packages/api/src/resolvers/webhooks/index.ts stores the caller-supplied url without any address validation, and the file imports no validation helper. When a subscribed event fires, callWebhook in packages/api/src/jobs/call_webhook.ts issues axios.request with that url, the method and Content-Type recorded on the webhook, and a JSON body carrying the event data, so an authenticated user can make the server send repeated attacker-shaped requests to internal endpoints, including link-local metadata addresses. The request is blind: callWebhook discards the result and writes only a success line or the axios error to the server log, so the response is not returned through the API.
From the CVE record · VulnCheck