ima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 3ea7a56067e663278470c04fd655adf809e72d4d · < 27f3924061592d0ef6b04e16f48754b6cb6adf27| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()
The digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:
if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >= iint->ima_hash->length)
sizeof() yields size_t, so the usual arithmetic conversions promote the whole left-hand side to unsigned 64-bit before the subtraction runs. For a truncated xattr this underflows instead of going negative: a 1-byte IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG xattr (xattr_len == 1, hash_start == 1) turns "1 - 1 - 1" into SIZE_MAX, which is trivially >= ima_hash->length. The check then passes and the following memcmp() reads iint->ima_hash->length bytes starting past the end of the buffer vfs_getxattr_alloc() allocated for it.
Nothing upstream clamps xattr_len back into a safe range first: ima_get_hash_algo() only special-cases xattr_len < 2 to pick a default algorithm, and evm_verifyxattr() returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN rather than failing when no HMAC key is loaded, so a truncated security.ima value reaches the length check as-is.
Rewrite the comparison so every operand stays a signed int and no implicit conversion to size_t can occur.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s IMA xattr verification can read past an allocated buffer when a truncated security.ima attribute causes a digest-length check to underflow. The input does not specify whether an attacker needs local or network access, authentication, or user interaction to trigger this condition.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check their versions; affected versions are not specified in the input.