lockd: Avoid hashing uninitialized bytes in nlm4svc_lookup_file()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lockd: Avoid hashing uninitialized bytes in nlm4svc_lookup_file()
file_hash() digests the first LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE bytes of nfs_fh.data when bucketing nlm_files[], independent of fh.size. Commit 3de744ee4e45 ("lockd: Use xdrgen XDR functions for the NLMv4 TEST procedure") set .pc_argzero to zero for the converted procedures and moved file-handle population into nlm4svc_lookup_file(), which copies only xdr_lock->fh.len bytes into lock->fh.data.
When an NLMv4 client presents a file handle shorter than LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE, bytes fh.len..31 retain whatever the argument buffer held from an earlier request. The same wire handle then hashes to different buckets across calls; nlm_lookup_file() misses the existing nlm_file entry, and lock-state lookups fail.
Zero only the tail bytes that file_hash() would otherwise consume. Handles of LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE or larger already populate every byte that file_hash() reads.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s lockd component can hash uninitialized bytes when an NLMv4 client sends a file handle shorter than LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE. The same handle can then hash to different buckets across requests, causing lock-state lookups to fail. The issue is triggered by client requests; the input does not specify authentication requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with lockd should check their vendor’s advisory; affected versions are not specified.