inets, httpd: HTTP Request Smuggling via Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length
Erlang OTP
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
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Erlang OTP
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
|
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httpd function check_header/3 rejects duplicate Content-Length (per CVE-2026-23941) but never checks for the TE+CL co-presence that RFC 9112 §6.3 identifies as a probable smuggling attempt. handle_body/3 frames by chunked and silently discards Content-Length. A CL-preferring front-end paired with chunked-preferring inets creates a classic CL.TE front-end/back-end desync.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, OTP 28.5.0.6, and OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, 9.6.2.3, and 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.
From the CVE record · EEF
Erlang OTP’s inets httpd does not reject requests containing both Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length headers. When a Content-Length-preferring front end is paired with the chunked-preferring httpd back end, a network attacker can cause request-framing disagreement and HTTP request smuggling. The input does not specify whether authentication or user interaction is required.
Operators running Erlang OTP 17.0 through versions before the applicable OTP 27.3.4.17, 28.5.0.6, or 29.0.6 fix should check their deployments; whether earlier versions are affected is unknown.