NextAuth.js: Email normalizer validates the address before Unicode normalization, allowing a homoglyph @ bypass
nextauthjs next-auth · @auth core
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| @auth/core npm |
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| next-auth npm |
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nextauthjs next-auth · @auth core
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| @auth/core npm |
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| next-auth npm |
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NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, the defaultNormalizer used by the email and magic-link sign-in flow validates an address before applying Unicode normalization. An address can contain a Unicode character such as U+FF20 FULLWIDTH COMMERCIAL AT that is not ASCII at-sign but canonicalizes to an ASCII at-sign under NFKC or NFKD normalization. The address passes the normalizer's single-at-sign check, but a downstream sendVerificationRequest mail library or delivery service that normalizes the address can then see two at-sign separators and deliver the passwordless sign-in link to an attacker-controlled recipient. Applications are affected when the email provider uses the built-in normalizer rather than a custom normalizeIdentifier and the downstream sender applies Unicode normalization. An attacker who knows a victim's email address can request the misrouted magic link and sign in as the victim without victim interaction. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
The built-in email normalizer in @auth/core and next-auth validates addresses before Unicode normalization. If an application uses that normalizer and its downstream mail sender normalizes addresses, an attacker who knows a victim’s email address can request a misrouted magic link and sign in as the victim without victim interaction.
Check applications running npm @auth/core >=0.1.0 <0.41.3 or next-auth >=4.10.3 <4.24.15 or >=5.0.0-beta.1 <5.0.0-beta.32.