seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ fe94cc290f535709d3c5ebd1e472dfd0aec7ee79 · < 8dba7a94a269b88e500aafc25ad567ef6a423698| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields
seg6_validate_srh() reads fixed SRH fields such as srh->type and srh->hdrlen before checking that the supplied length covers the fixed struct ipv6_sr_hdr fields.
The BPF SEG6 encap path reaches this with a BPF program-supplied pointer and length: bpf_lwt_push_encap() and the SEG6 local BPF END_B6 and END_B6_ENCAP actions call bpf_push_seg6_encap(), which forwards the length to seg6_validate_srh() with no minimum-size guard. A 2-byte SEG6 encap header can therefore make the validator read srh->type at offset 2 beyond the caller-supplied buffer.
Reject lengths shorter than the fixed SRH at the top of seg6_validate_srh(), before any field is read. This fixes the BPF helper path and keeps the common validator robust.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s seg6 SRH validator reads fixed header fields before checking that the supplied buffer is long enough. A locally supplied BPF program can pass a too-short SEG6 encap header through the affected BPF paths, causing a read beyond the supplied buffer; the input does not specify authentication requirements or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected seg6 BPF paths should check their kernel version; affected versions are not specified.