net/sched: cake: reject overhead values that underflow length
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ a729b7f0bd5bf4919306556aed614438f5174537 · < 7aa0e64fea778a9e3df73e64da95367ff8ad2ea5| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cake: reject overhead values that underflow length
CAKE accepts signed overhead values and stores them in an s16, but the adjusted packet length calculation uses unsigned arithmetic. A negative effective length can therefore wrap to a large value.
Such configurations make rate accounting depend on integer wraparound rather than on the packet size userspace intended to model. A static netlink lower bound is not enough because packets reaching CAKE can be smaller than any reasonable manual-overhead allowance.
Fold the signed overhead adjustment into the existing datapath MPU clamp so negative adjusted lengths are clamped before link-layer framing adjustments.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's CAKE scheduler can wrap a negative adjusted packet length to a large value because it uses unsigned arithmetic with a signed overhead setting. This can cause incorrect rate accounting when the configured overhead makes a packet's adjusted length negative. The input does not describe an attacker path or authentication requirements.
Engineers running the Linux kernel with CAKE and signed overhead settings should check whether their kernel is affected; no affected versions are specified.