smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 2b1116bbe898aefdf584838448c6869f69851e0f · < 1627e7d5c9b09721a141d07cedb178882f1ded67| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check
smb2_ioctl_query_info() validates the PASSTHRU_FSCTL response payload before copying it to userspace.
The payload offset and length both come from 32-bit fields. The bounds check currently adds OutputOffset and qi.input_buffer_length directly, so the addition can wrap in 32-bit arithmetic before the result is compared against the response buffer length.
A malicious server can use a large OutputOffset and a small OutputCount to make the wrapped sum pass the bounds check. The later copy_to_user() then reads from io_rsp + OutputOffset, outside the response buffer.
Use size_add() for the offset plus length check so overflow is treated as out of bounds.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel SMB client has an integer overflow in a PASSTHRU_FSCTL response bounds check. A malicious SMB server can craft a response that passes the check and causes the client to read outside the response buffer during a copy to userspace. This requires the client to process a response from the malicious server.
Administrators running Linux systems that use the SMB client should check their kernel versions; affected versions were not specified.