orangefs: keep the readdir entry size 64-bit in fill_from_part()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 480e3e532e31666a18520a7964bb4095d7a16b9a · < 82fc886e244c76fadf05ef1958aaf8815478ccde| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
orangefs: keep the readdir entry size 64-bit in fill_from_part()
fill_from_part() computes the size of a directory entry in size_t but stores it in a __u32. An entry length near U32_MAX wraps it to a small value, bypasses the bounds check, and is then used to index the entry, reading far past the directory part -- an out-of-bounds read that oopses the kernel.
Compute the size as a u64 so it cannot truncate; the bounds check then rejects the entry. The trailer is supplied by the userspace client.
From the CVE record · Linux
OrangeFS directory entry handling in the Linux kernel truncates an entry size to 32 bits. An entry length near U32_MAX in a trailer supplied by the userspace client can bypass a bounds check, causing an out-of-bounds read and a kernel oops. The input does not specify authentication requirements or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels with OrangeFS should check their versions; affected versions are not specified.