macsec: don't read an unset MAC header in macsec_encrypt()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ c09440f7dcb304002dfced8c0fea289eb25f2da0 · < 2cf10d042562283ff4ae97c02d0993d4f1b5ea29| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macsec: don't read an unset MAC header in macsec_encrypt()
macsec_encrypt() reads the Ethernet header via eth_hdr(skb) (skb->head + skb->mac_header) to memmove() the 12 source/destination MAC bytes forward and make room for the SecTAG.
On the AF_PACKET SOCK_RAW + PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS transmit path the skb reaches the macsec ndo_start_xmit() with the MAC header unset, so eth_hdr(skb) resolves to skb->head + (u16)~0 and the read is out of bounds: a 12-byte heap over-read that is also emitted on the wire as the frame's outer source/destination MAC. KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds read in macsec_start_xmit() on 6.0; on current mainline a CONFIG_DEBUG_NET build flags it as an unset mac header in skb_mac_header().
On the TX path the L2 header is at skb->data, so use skb_eth_hdr(), added by commit 96cc4b69581d ("macvlan: do not assume mac_header is set in macvlan_broadcast()") for exactly this purpose.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's macsec_encrypt() reads outside a packet buffer when an AF_PACKET SOCK_RAW transmission with PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS reaches macsec with the MAC header unset. The 12 bytes read from outside the buffer can be emitted on the wire as the frame's outer source and destination MAC addresses. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with macsec should check their kernel's exposure to this transmit path; affected versions are not specified.