{"schemaVersion":1,"url":"https://cve.openhack.com/cve/CVE-2026-71886","id":"CVE-2026-71886","title":"OpenPGP certification accepted from a subkey without certification authority","description":"In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier ag","descriptionLong":"In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.","published":"2026-10-03T08:46:33.868Z","updated":"2026-11-04T17:27:21.757770451Z","reserved":"2026-08-08T00:06:06.982Z","status":"Awaiting Analysis","rejected":false,"assigner":"bcorg","metric":{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber","rating":"high","source":"bcorg"},"metrics":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber","rating":"high","source":"bcorg"},{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber","rating":"high","source":"91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630"},{"version":"4.0","score":null,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber","rating":"unrated","source":"OSV"}],"rating":"high","products":["Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-JAVA"],"affectedProducts":[{"vendor":"Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.","product":"BC-JAVA","defaultStatus":"unaffected","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"1.81","lessThan":"1.86","versionType":"maven"}],"platforms":["all"]}],"packages":[],"cwes":["CWE-863","CWE-285"],"aliases":[],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9071886","tags":["vendor-advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/f0d5c8535aeff3f34b7b6b6289ee78c2ea36a3fb","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://www.bouncycastle.org/download/bouncy-castle-java/","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/71xxx/CVE-2026-71886.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71886","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java","tags":["package"]}],"patchReferenced":true,"fixAvailable":true,"exploitReferenced":false,"kev":false,"kevAdded":null,"kevDue":null,"kevEntry":null,"ssvc":{"exploitation":"none","automatable":"no","technicalImpact":"partial"},"epss":0.00167,"epssPercentile":0.05994,"sources":[{"name":"CVE List","url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-71886","ok":true},{"name":"NVD","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71886","ok":true,"note":"Awaiting Analysis"},{"name":"OSV","url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-71886","ok":true,"note":"0 packages"},{"name":"CISA KEV","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog","ok":true,"note":"not listed"},{"name":"EPSS","url":"https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-71886","ok":true,"note":"scored 2026-11-18"}],"aiTitle":false,"tech":[],"critical":[],"attention":null}