Electron: Parent process code-sign check is spoofable
electron
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| electron npm |
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electron
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| electron npm |
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Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, the check Electron uses on macOS to confirm it was launched by a same-signed parent process could be bypassed by a local process. Apps that enable fuse-based hardening restricting ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE and NODE_OPTIONS to same-signed parents rely on this check, and a local attacker could bypass it and run code inside the signed app, inheriting its TCC permissions and keychain access. This issue is fixed in 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
Electron’s macOS check that a parent process is signed with the same identity can be bypassed by a local process. In apps that use fuse-based hardening to restrict ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE and NODE_OPTIONS to same-signed parents, a local attacker can run code inside the signed app and inherit its TCC permissions and keychain access.
Engineers running macOS apps built with npm electron versions <39.8.8, >=40.0.0-alpha.1 <40.9.1, >=41.0.0-alpha.1 <41.2.1, or >=42.0.0-alpha.1 <42.0.0-beta.3 should check their dependencies.