Bluetooth: btrtl: validate firmware patch bounds
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ db33c77dddc2ed2cff3061d0b096a9f5ab0c3647 · < 6744ab60dfac55d1df5733960aad5be300984301| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btrtl: validate firmware patch bounds
rtlbt_parse_firmware() copies patch_length - 4 bytes before appending the firmware version. A malformed firmware patch shorter than the version field can make this subtraction underflow and turn the copy into an oversized read and write during Bluetooth setup.
The existing patch_offset + patch_length check can also wrap on 32-bit architectures. Validate the patch length and range without arithmetic overflow before allocating or copying the patch.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s btrtl firmware parser does not adequately validate Bluetooth firmware patch lengths and bounds. A malformed patch can trigger an oversized read and write during Bluetooth setup; the input does not specify how an attacker would supply the patch or whether authentication or user interaction is required.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected Bluetooth btrtl component should check their versions against the vendor advisory; affected versions are not specified.