IB/mad: Drop unmatched RMPP responses before reassembly
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ fa619a77046bef30478697aba0553991033afb8e · < 98d2d468b4faa1fdc68c0c6c238389906ee3490c| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/mad: Drop unmatched RMPP responses before reassembly
Kernel-handled RMPP receive processing starts reassembly for active DATA responses before the response is matched to an outstanding send. The normal match happens later, after ib_process_rmpp_recv_wc() has either assembled a complete message or consumed the segment.
That ordering lets an unsolicited response that routes to a kernel RMPP agent by the high TID bits allocate or extend RMPP receive state before the full TID and source address are checked against a real request. A reordered burst can therefore reach the receive-side insertion path even though the response would not match any send.
For kernel-handled RMPP DATA responses, require the existing ib_find_send_mad() match before entering RMPP reassembly. The matcher already checks the full TID, management class and source address/GID against the agent wait, backlog and in-flight send lists. If there is no match, drop the response without creating RMPP state.
This leaves the RMPP window behavior unchanged and only rejects responses that have no corresponding request.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel can start reassembling an RMPP DATA response before checking whether it matches an outstanding request. An attacker able to send unsolicited responses to a kernel RMPP agent can cause receive state to be allocated or extended, even when the responses match no request. No user interaction is described.
Engineers running Linux kernels that handle RMPP DATA responses should check whether their kernel includes this fix; affected versions are not specified.