iommu/intel: Fix out-of-bounds memset in dmar_latency_disable()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 55ee5e67a59a1b6f388d7a1c7b24022145f47a3e · < 0e28ca1c3204b51068579defc904a0dfba5e5c57| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/intel: Fix out-of-bounds memset in dmar_latency_disable()
dmar_latency_disable() intends to zero out only the single latency_statistic entry for the given type, but the memset size was computed as sizeof(*lstat) * DMAR_LATENCY_NUM, which clears the entire array starting from &lstat[type].
When type > 0, this writes beyond the end of the allocated array, corrupting adjacent memory.
Fix by using sizeof(*lstat) to clear only the target entry.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's Intel IOMMU dmar_latency_disable() can write beyond its allocated array when the latency type is greater than zero, corrupting adjacent memory. The input does not establish how an attacker could trigger this, whether authentication is needed, or whether user interaction is required.
Operators running the Linux kernel should check their versions; affected versions were not specified.