tipc: fix integer overflow in tipc_recvmsg() and tipc_recvstream()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ e9f8b10101c6da3ab000a2fb17162374c9bd2c69 · < 47f42ff521b4eeb46e82f9a46a4783a99f7570d7| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix integer overflow in tipc_recvmsg() and tipc_recvstream()
In tipc_recvmsg(), the copy length is computed as:
copy = min_t(int, dlen - offset, buflen);
buflen is size_t but min_t(int, ...) casts it to int. When buflen exceeds INT_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF via io_uring provided buffers), it wraps negative, wins the comparison, and the negative copy length propagates to simple_copy_to_iter() where int-to-size_t promotion makes it SIZE_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON. tipc_recvstream() has the same pattern.
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ... RIP: 0010:simple_copy_to_iter+0x9e/0xd0 (net/core/datagram.c:521) Call Trace: __skb_datagram_iter+0x123/0x8b0 (net/core/datagram.c:402) skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x77/0x1a0 (net/core/datagram.c:534) tipc_recvmsg+0x3d7/0xe80 (net/tipc/socket.c:1934) io_recvmsg+0x47e/0xda0
Fix by changing min_t(int, ...) to min_t(size_t, ...) in both functions. The result is always <= (dlen - offset), which is bounded by TIPC maximum message size (0x1ffff bytes), so the implicit narrowing on assignment to int copy is always safe.
From the CVE record · Linux
An integer overflow in the Linux kernel’s tipc_recvmsg() and tipc_recvstream() can turn an oversized receive buffer length into a negative copy length. A caller supplying such a buffer, for example through io_uring, can trigger a warning and a kernel panic if panic_on_warn is enabled. The input does not establish whether this can be triggered over a network or requires authentication.
Engineers running Linux kernels with TIPC should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions are not specified.