fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 22e9947a4b2ba255888541bd0111cf00b9b16586 · < 6fe4e4b8259e1330945b5f3c9476e08473b8e0e8| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()
When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices, then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(), blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.
Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because:
- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.
- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free.
For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that.
(Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.)
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's fscrypt_get_devices() dynamically allocates an array of block devices. If that allocation fails while an inline encryption key is destroyed during inode eviction under direct reclaim, the key can be freed without being evicted, causing a use-after-free. The input does not specify how an attacker could trigger this condition or whether access or user interaction is required.
Engineers running Linux kernels with fscrypt should check their kernel version; affected versions are not specified.