tcp: challenge ACK for non-exact RST in SYN-RECEIVED
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 282f23c6ee343126156dd41218b22ece96d747e3 · < a28c4fcbf774e23b4779cae468e3497a5ad1f4a1| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: challenge ACK for non-exact RST in SYN-RECEIVED
The SYN-RECEIVED request-socket path in tcp_check_req() accepts an in-window RST without requiring SEG.SEQ to exactly match RCV.NXT. A non-exact RST therefore removes the request instead of eliciting a challenge ACK.
RFC 9293 section 3.10.7.4 applies the RFC 5961 reset check in SYN-RECEIVED: an exact RST resets the connection, while a non-exact in-window RST must trigger a challenge ACK and be dropped.
Apply that check before the ACK-field validation, following the RFC sequence-number, RST, then ACK processing order. Factor the per-netns challenge ACK quota out of tcp_send_challenge_ack() so request sockets can share it. Use the request socket's send_ack() callback and its own out-of-window ACK timestamp to send and rate-limit the response.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's TCP SYN-RECEIVED request-socket path accepts a non-exact, in-window RST instead of sending a challenge ACK. A network attacker able to send such an RST can remove the pending request; the input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions are not specified.