inets,httpd:HTTP Request Smuggling via obs-fold Header Continuation
Erlang OTP
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
|
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Erlang OTP
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
|
|
e640d599287d2eba919e6f13b91f042d7dbe6ff4httpd has never implemented obs-fold (RFC 2616 §2.2 / RFC 7230 §3.2.4 header continuation lines). Every CRLF followed by a non-CRLF octet unconditionally starts a new header. This missing feature became a security concern as the understanding of HTTP request smuggling attacks evolved.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, OTP 28.5.0.6, and OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, 9.6.2.3, and 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.
From the CVE record · EEF
Erlang OTP’s httpd does not implement folded HTTP header lines, treating each line as a new header. When httpd receives requests containing those lines, this parsing behavior may enable HTTP request smuggling by a remote attacker. The input does not specify whether authentication or user interaction is required.
Teams running Erlang OTP from 17.0 before the applicable fixes in 27.3.4.17, 28.5.0.6, or 29.0.6, or the corresponding inets releases from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, 9.6.2.3, or 9.7.2.2, should check their installations; the status of earlier releases is unknown.