virtio-net: fix len check in receive_big()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 0c716703965ffc5ef4311b65cb5d84a703784717 · < 9e5ad06ea826322ce8c58b4a68442a96f600c3c4| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-net: fix len check in receive_big()
receive_big() bounds the device-announced length by (big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE. That is still too loose: add_recvbuf_big() sets sg[1] to start at offset sizeof(struct padded_vnet_hdr) into the first page, so the chain actually carries hdr_len + (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(padded_vnet_hdr)) + big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE bytes -- 20 bytes less than the check allows for the common hdr_len == 12 case.
A malicious virtio backend can announce a len in that gap. page_to_skb() then walks one frag past the page chain, storing a NULL page->private into skb_shinfo()->frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS], which is both an out-of-bounds write past the static frag array and a NULL frag handed up the rx path.
Bound len by the size add_recvbuf_big() actually advertised.
From the CVE record · Linux
The virtio-net receive_big() length check can accept a packet length beyond the advertised page chain. A malicious virtio backend can use that gap to trigger an out-of-bounds write and pass a NULL fragment into the receive path. This requires control of the virtio backend; no user interaction is described.
Engineers running the Linux kernel with virtio-net should check their kernel against the vendor advisory; affected versions were not provided.