staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b · < 64ec4192d9c10e96922245d4a6747304cc76b19d| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth()
OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path.
When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as:
length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len
and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing the IV field and calling the decryption path.
When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128 bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching the check already applied to OnAuthClient().
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s rtl8723bs shared-key authentication path does not adequately check WEP frame and Challenge Text IE lengths. Malformed authentication frames can cause an out-of-bounds read during decryption or challenge comparison. The input does not establish whether authentication or user interaction is required.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the rtl8723bs driver should check their exposure; affected versions were not provided.