proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (part 1)
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ f83ce3e6b02d5e48b3a43b001390e2b58820389d · < f9b4b03ccc9c69bf7f7298d4559906ebea7143b3| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (part 1)
Fix the easy cases where procfs currently calls ptrace_may_access() without exec_update_lock protection, where the fix is to simply add the extra lock or use mm_access():
- do_task_stat(): grab exec_update_lock - proc_pid_wchan(): grab exec_update_lock - proc_map_files_lookup(): use mm_access() instead of get_task_mm() - proc_map_files_readdir(): use mm_access() instead of get_task_mm() - proc_ns_get_link(): grab exec_update_lock - proc_ns_readlink(): grab exec_update_lock
From the CVE record · Linux
Several procfs paths in the Linux kernel call ptrace_may_access() without exec_update_lock protection. The input does not specify what an attacker could achieve, whether authentication is needed, or whether user interaction is required; the affected paths involve procfs access.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check their versions; affected versions are not specified.