udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 · < 04f4599a9efb90992d072a814960edf0cd62805d| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count
udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when
sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > sb->s_blocksize
is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that must fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte sparingEntry elements:
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen); i++) { struct sparingEntry *entry = &st->mapEntry[i]; ... entry->origLocation ... }
in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks(). A reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever sizeof(*st) + N <= blocksize, yet the consumers index sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the block. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the block, and its memmove() through st->mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds write.
Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with struct_size().
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's UDF code checks a sparing table's entry count as though it were a byte count. When the kernel processes a crafted UDF image, this can cause out-of-bounds reads and a write. The input does not specify access, authentication, or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels that process UDF images should check their installations; affected versions are not specified.