drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 4f8e37dbaf584de6d38f58b3000b0bfd7eaf2ff6 · < 1c8c6e912f2945b2a3e669afca6b52174b88e86e| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async
[Why&How] dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload->length bytes into a 16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which is a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length > 16 this results in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy.
Additionally, link_index is used to dereference dc->links[] without bounds checking against dc->link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access.
Replace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when payload->length exceeds the destination buffer size, and add a bounds check for link_index before it is used.
(cherry picked from commit ba4caa9fecdf7a38f98c878ad05a8a64148b6881)
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s AMD display driver does not enforce a 16-byte payload limit or check link_index against the number of links in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async(). If a caller passes a payload longer than 16 bytes or an out-of-range link_index, the kernel can encounter a stack buffer overflow or out-of-bounds access. The input does not specify whether an attacker can reach this code over a network or locally, or whether authentication or user interaction is required.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the AMD display driver should check their kernel versions; affected versions are not specified.