KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area
When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of the shared buffer.
The code was "fine" when first introduced, as KVM doesn't consult the length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert).
Opportunistically rename @len => @min_len to better reflect its role.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's KVM SEV code can calculate the wrong usable length for a GHCB scratch area in the shared buffer. During PSC requests, a guest-provided pointer can cause a buffer overflow; the input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with KVM SEV should check whether their kernel is affected; affected versions are not specified.