USB: serial: belkin_sa: validate interrupt status length
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · < 22823a319fb2afdf02cacafbed8b613b757efbc8| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: belkin_sa: validate interrupt status length
The Belkin interrupt callback treats interrupt data as a four-byte status report and reads LSR/MSR fields at offsets 2 and 3. The interrupt-in buffer length is derived from endpoint wMaxPacketSize, and short interrupt transfers may complete successfully with a smaller actual_length.
Check the completed interrupt packet length before parsing status fields so short interrupt endpoints and short successful packets are ignored instead of causing out-of-bounds or stale status-byte reads.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in belkin_sa_read_int_callback() Read of size 1 Call trace: belkin_sa_read_int_callback() (drivers/usb/serial/belkin_sa.c:202) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb() (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1630) dummy_timer() (?:?)
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s belkin_sa USB serial interrupt callback reads status fields without first checking that the completed packet is long enough. A short successful USB interrupt transfer can cause out-of-bounds or stale status-byte reads; the input does not specify attacker access, authentication requirements, or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the belkin_sa USB serial driver should check their versions; affected versions are not specified.