thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ cdae7c07e3e3509eaabc18c1640a55dc5b99c179 · < 830c8a9b467e7d3a158483d37fa7dc13892b293a| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()
A DIRECTORY entry's value field is used as the dir_offset for a recursive call into __tb_property_parse_dir() with no depth counter. A crafted peer that chains DIRECTORY entries into a back-reference loop drives the parser until the kernel stack is exhausted and the guard page fires. Any untrusted XDomain peer (cable, dock, in-line inspector, adjacent host) that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST control-plane exchange can trigger this without authentication.
Thread a depth counter through tb_property_parse() and __tb_property_parse_dir(), and reject blocks that exceed TB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH = 8. That is comfortably larger than any observed legitimate XDomain layout.
Operators who do not need XDomain host-to-host discovery can disable the path entirely with thunderbolt.xdomain=0 on the kernel command line.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Thunderbolt XDomain property parser can recurse until the kernel stack is exhausted when it processes crafted DIRECTORY entries. An untrusted XDomain peer that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST exchange can trigger this without authentication.
Operators running Linux kernels with Thunderbolt XDomain discovery enabled should check whether their kernel includes the recursion-depth fix.