phpMyFAQ - Authenticated Path Traversal in PDF Export via concatenatePaths Function
phpMyFAQ
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| thorsten/phpmyfaq Packagist |
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| phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq Packagist |
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phpMyFAQ
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| thorsten/phpmyfaq Packagist |
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| phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq Packagist |
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phpMyFAQ before 4.1.5 contains a potential authenticated path traversal vulnerability in the concatenatePaths() function within src/phpMyFAQ/Export/Pdf/Wrapper.php. A user with FAQ editing privileges can store HTML containing crafted image paths that are processed during PDF generation. The path resolution logic locates the substring "content" within a user-controlled path using strpos(); when "content" is absent, strpos() returns false, which becomes 0 when cast to an integer, preserving the entire attacker-controlled path. This path is later passed to file_get_contents() without canonicalization or root-directory containment validation, which may allow reading of files outside the intended content directory.
From the CVE record · VulnCheck
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.5 has a potential path traversal vulnerability in PDF path handling. An authenticated user with FAQ editing privileges can store crafted image paths in HTML; when a PDF is generated, those paths may allow files outside the intended content directory to be read.
Teams using the Packagist packages thorsten/phpmyfaq or phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq from 4.0.0-alpha up to, but not including, 4.1.5 should check their installations.