Contao: Possible path traversal in job download URIs
contao
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| contao/contao Packagist |
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| contao/core-bundle Packagist |
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contao
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| contao/contao Packagist |
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| contao/core-bundle Packagist |
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Contao is an Open Source CMS. In versions 5.7.0 through 5.7.6, an authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing ../ segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside var/job-attachments. The controller authorizes only the jobUuid route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled identifier, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. VirtualFilesystem::resolve() canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv becomes victim-job/debug_log.csv. This is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
In Contao 5.7.0 through 5.7.6, the job attachment download endpoint can read files from another job directory when given an attachment identifier containing ../ segments. An authenticated backend user with access to one job can use this to download attachments from another job if they know its attachment path.
Teams running contao/contao or contao/core-bundle versions 5.7.0 through 5.7.6 should check their installations.