Coder's workspace app CORS origin check can be bypassed via UUID-based subdomain spoofing
coder
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/coder/coder/v2 Go |
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coder
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/coder/coder/v2 Go |
|
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| github.com/coder/coder Go |
| No fix yet |
Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. Prior to versions 2.29.17, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2, Coder's subdomain-based workspace app proxy allowed the same-owner CORS check to be bypassed. When a workspace-name subdomain segment parsed as a UUID, the workspace was resolved by ID without confirming the URL's username matched the real owner, while the CORS middleware trusted the unverified username in the hostname. Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled and a victim who visits the attacker's crafted app URL while authenticated. The fix in versions 2.29.17, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2 validates the subdomain username against the resolved workspace's actual owner and bases the same-owner CORS decision on the authoritative owner identity. No known workarounds are available.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
Coder's subdomain-based workspace app proxy can bypass its same-owner CORS check when a workspace-name subdomain segment parses as a UUID. Exploitation requires wildcard subdomain app routing and an authenticated victim visiting an attacker-crafted app URL.
Teams running affected github.com/coder/coder/v2 versions (>=2.34.0 <2.34.2, >=2.33.0 <2.33.8, >=2.30.0 <2.32.7, or <2.29.17) or any version of github.com/coder/coder should check their deployments.