Coder: Zip upload decompression lacks aggregate size limit, enabling denial of service
coder
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/coder/coder/v2 Go |
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coder
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/coder/coder/v2 Go |
|
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| github.com/coder/coder Go |
| No fix yet |
Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. Starting in version 2.17.0 and prior to versions 2.29.7, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2, `POST /api/v2/files` converts zip uploads to tar in memory via `CreateTarFromZip`, which enforced a per-entry size limit but no aggregate limit on total decompressed output, writing to an unbounded in-memory buffer. Exploitation requires authenticated file-upload access and the impact is limited to availability (denial of service). The fix in versions 2.29.7, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2 adds a metadata preflight check that sums projected entry sizes and a streaming writer that enforces the aggregate limit during decompression. As a workaround, restrict file-upload permissions to trusted users or place a reverse proxy with request-body size limits in front of `coderd`.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
Coder's POST /api/v2/files endpoint converts ZIP uploads to TAR in memory without an aggregate limit on decompressed output. An authenticated user with file-upload access can exhaust memory and cause a denial of service; no other impact is described.
Operators using Go github.com/coder/coder/v2 in versions >=2.17.0 <2.29.17, >=2.30.0 <2.32.7, >=2.33.0 <2.33.8, or >=2.34.0 <2.34.2, or using github.com/coder/coder at any version, should check their deployments.