sctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
6.18.367.0.137.1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing
When a listening SCTP server processes a COOKIE_ECHO chunk, the cached peer INIT chunk embedded after the cookie is parsed and its parameters are later walked by sctp_process_init() using sctp_walk_params().
However, the chunk header length of this cached INIT chunk was not validated against the remaining buffer in the COOKIE_ECHO payload. If the length field is inflated, the parameter walk can run beyond the actual received data, leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential memory corruption during later parameter handling (e.g. STATE_COOKIE processing and kmemdup() copies).
Add a bounds check in sctp_unpack_cookie() to ensure the cached INIT chunk length does not exceed the available data in the COOKIE_ECHO buffer before it is used.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel does not validate the length of a cached peer INIT chunk inside a COOKIE_ECHO payload before walking its parameters. A remote sender can provide an inflated length to a listening SCTP server, causing out-of-bounds reads and potential memory corruption. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Operators of Linux systems running listening SCTP servers should check their kernel; affected versions are not specified.