netlabel: validate unlabeled address and mask attribute lengths
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 8cc44579d1bd77ba3a32f2cb76fd9669c229c5fd · < 0c4bb32ad7fdc2dc6a8050f41eb04d4bda56b6c8| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlabel: validate unlabeled address and mask attribute lengths
netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get() used the address attribute length to determine whether the attribute data could be read as an IPv4 or IPv6 address, but did not independently validate the corresponding mask attribute length. A crafted Generic Netlink request could therefore provide a valid IPv4/IPv6 address attribute with a shorter mask attribute, which would later be read as a full struct in_addr or struct in6_addr.
NLA_BINARY policy lengths are maximum lengths by default, so use NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN() for the unlabeled IPv4/IPv6 address and mask attributes. This rejects short attributes during policy validation and also exposes the exact length requirements through policy introspection.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s netlabel code did not independently validate the length of an unlabeled address mask attribute. An attacker able to submit a crafted Generic Netlink request could cause a short mask attribute to be read as a full IPv4 or IPv6 address structure; the input does not specify authentication requirements.
Teams running the Linux kernel should check their versions against the vendor advisory; affected versions are not specified here.