netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ f6d0cbcf09c506b9b022df8f9d7693a7cec3c732 · < 84d8f58cf28a0415413f43ba7148f7bacd4c1b6e| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register
For NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIFNAME the destination register is declared with len = IFNAMSIZ (four 32-bit registers), but on the lookup-fail, RTN_LOCAL and oif-mismatch paths nft_fib{4,6}_eval() only writes one register via "*dest = 0". The remaining three registers are left as whatever was on the stack in nft_do_chain()'s struct nft_regs, and a downstream expression that loads the register span can leak that uninitialised kernel stack to userspace.
The NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT existence check has the same shape: it is only meaningful for NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF, yet it was accepted for any result type while the eval stores a single byte via nft_reg_store8(), leaving the rest of the declared span stale.
Fix both:
- replace the bare "*dest = 0" in the eval with nft_fib_store_result(), which strscpy_pad()s the whole IFNAMSIZ for OIFNAME (and is already used on the other early-return path), and
- restrict NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT to NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF and declare its destination as a single u8, so the marked span matches the one byte the eval writes.
From the CVE record · Linux
In the Linux kernel’s netfilter nft_fib component, some rule evaluation paths leave part of a destination register uninitialized. A downstream expression that reads those registers can expose kernel stack data to userspace; the input does not specify whether exploitation requires local access, authentication, or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels with netfilter nft_fib should check their kernel versions; affected versions are not specified.