tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
6.18.367.0.137.1In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user()
tun_put_user() declares an on-stack struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel without zeroing it. For a non-tunnel skb, virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb() only initializes the first 10 bytes (sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)), leaving bytes 10..23 (num_buffers and the hash/tunnel fields) as stack garbage.
An unprivileged user can set the vnet header size to 24 with TUNSETVNETHDRSZ, so __tun_vnet_hdr_put() copies all 24 bytes of the partially-initialized struct to userspace, leaking 14 bytes of kernel stack on every read of a non-tunnel packet.
Fix it the same way tun_get_user() already does by zeroing the whole header right after declaration.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's tun_put_user() can copy uninitialized vnet header bytes to userspace. An unprivileged user who sets the vnet header size to 24 can receive 14 bytes of kernel stack data on each read of a non-tunnel packet.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected tun code should check their installations; affected versions are not specified.