tap: fix stack info leak in tap_ioctl() SIOCGIFHWADDR
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 3b23a32a63219f51a5298bc55a65ecee866e79d0 · < bddc09212c24934643bd44fc794748d2bbb3b6cd| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tap: fix stack info leak in tap_ioctl() SIOCGIFHWADDR
In the SIOCGIFHWADDR path, tap_ioctl() copies 16 bytes of an uninitialised on-stack struct sockaddr_storage to userspace via ifr_hwaddr, but netif_get_mac_address() only writes sa_family and dev->addr_len (6 for Ethernet) bytes, leaving sa_data[6..13] uninitialised.
Those 8 trailing bytes leak kernel stack contents; SIOCGIFHWADDR on a macvtap chardev returns kernel .text and direct-map pointers, defeating KASLR.
Initialise ss at declaration.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s tap_ioctl() can return eight uninitialized stack bytes through SIOCGIFHWADDR. A local caller using a macvtap character device can receive kernel pointers, defeating KASLR.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected tap_ioctl() implementation should check their systems; affected versions were not provided.