nebula-mesh: Decrypted CA private key persists in heap after signing
juev nebula-mesh
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/juev/nebula-mesh Go |
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| github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh Go |
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juev nebula-mesh
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/juev/nebula-mesh Go |
|
|
| github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh Go |
|
|
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.7, internal/pki/resolver.go:36-64 constructs a CAManager with the plaintext ed25519.PrivateKey after unwrapping via the master key; internal/pki/ca.go:13-16 stores it. Callers at internal/api/enroll.go:116, internal/api/updates.go:297, and internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:40 use the manager for one Sign() and drop the reference on function return — but the underlying slice contents are not wiped before release. The keystore package's contract (internal/keystore/keystore.go doc: "Callers MUST zeroise the returned plaintext DEK as soon as it is no longer needed") is not met by the CAManager consumer. Decrypted CA private keys persist in process heap until Go's GC scavenges the underlying slice — minutes to hours under load, indefinitely on idle servers. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.7.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
Before version 0.3.7, nebula-mesh leaves decrypted CA private keys in process memory after signing, potentially for minutes to hours or indefinitely on idle servers. This could expose the keys to someone able to inspect that memory; the input does not specify an attack path, authentication requirement, or user interaction.
Operators using Go packages github.com/juev/nebula-mesh or github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh before version 0.3.7 should check their installations.