Quest Bot: Untrusted pull request code can be built and deployed by privileged `workflow_run` deployment.
duck-organization quest-bot
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| duck-organization quest-bot |
| No fix yet |
Original description
Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M