io_uring/waitid: clear waitid info before copying it to userspace
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/waitid: clear waitid info before copying it to userspace
IORING_OP_WAITID stores its result fields in struct io_waitid::info and later copies them to userspace siginfo. The prep path initializes the request arguments, but it does not initialize info itself.
If the wait operation completes without reporting a child event, the common wait code can return without writing wo_info. In that case io_waitid_finish() still copies iw->info to userspace, exposing stale bytes from the reused io_kiocb command storage.
Clear the result storage during prep so the io_uring path matches the regular waitid syscall, which uses a zero-initialized struct waitid_info.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's IORING_OP_WAITID path can copy uninitialized result storage to userspace when a wait completes without reporting a child event. A local caller using this operation may receive stale bytes from reused command storage; the input does not specify authentication requirements or other user interaction.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check their installations; affected versions are not specified.