usb: usblp: fix uninitialized heap leak via LPGETSTATUS ioctl
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · < 762a6ccf391db0d629e590a803a3a2231e17dd3f| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: usblp: fix uninitialized heap leak via LPGETSTATUS ioctl
Just like in a previous problem in this driver, usblp_ctrl_msg() will collapse the usb_control_msg() return value to 0/-errno, discarding the actual number of bytes transferred.
Ideally that short command should be detected and error out, but many printers are known to send "incorrect" responses back so we can't just do that.
statusbuf is kmalloc(8) at probe time and never filled before the first LPGETSTATUS ioctl.
usblp_read_status() requests 1 byte. If a malicious printer responds with zero bytes, *statusbuf is one byte of stale kmalloc heap, sign-extended into the local int status, which the LPGETSTATUS path then copy_to_user()s directly to the ioctl caller.
Fix this all by just zapping out the memory buffer when allocated at probe time. If a later call does a short read, the data will be identical to what the device sent it the last time, so there is no "leak" of information happening.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's usblp driver can expose an uninitialized byte of heap memory through the LPGETSTATUS ioctl. This can happen when a malicious USB printer returns zero bytes to a status request and a local caller invokes the ioctl. Authentication requirements are not specified.
Engineers running Linux systems that use the usblp driver should check their kernel version; affected versions are not specified.