RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 · < 9b924f3a26b21330a837cfe72e819b6393bbeeaa| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv
rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used.
However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen:
payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE
This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users.
Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's RDMA/rxe receive path can calculate an underflowed payload size for a short incoming packet with a forged BTH pad field. An attacker able to send such a packet can cause the underflowed value to reach later receive-path code. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with RDMA/rxe should check their versions; affected versions are not specified.